EU GMP Annex 11
EU GMP guidance on computerized systems (2011 version, in force). Each clause below says what it asks for, in our words, and how nil answers it.
Built 13Partly built 3Planned 4Customer's procedure 2Vendor 1Not applicable 3
| Clause | Asks for (paraphrased) | How nil answers it | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Principle | Validate the application, qualify infrastructure; no added risk over the manual process | The vendor validates nil; the customer validates their configuration; infrastructure qualification comes with the deployment, which is not decided yet. Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Partly built |
| §1 | Risk management decides how far validation and data-integrity controls go | Every vendor requirement carries a risk level; on the customer side, each requirement on a Configuration Validation record carries a risk and its reason, and High and Medium risks need a test. Proved by requirementAC-cv-testing-1and testcv_ | Built |
| §2 | Defined responsibilities, qualifications, and access | Roles and groups explain who can do what and why Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Built |
| §3.1–3.4 | Agreements with suppliers; risk-based supplier assessment; supplier QMS information for inspectors | nil is the supplier: vendor assurance pack (validation report, threat models, SBOM, QMS summary) | Planned |
| §4.1–4.2 | Validation covers the lifecycle; includes change control records and deviation reports | Vendor: a validation report per release. Customer: the Configuration Validation record holds the change, its tests and their runs, test incidents, and the signed approval. Proved by requirementAC-cv-records-1and testcv_ | Built |
| §4.3 | Inventory and, for critical systems, an up-to-date system description | Configuration specification generated from the live system Proved by requirementAC-configuration-1and testconfiguration_ | Built |
| §4.4 | User requirements, risk-based, traceable through the lifecycle | Vendor: acceptance criteria traced to tests. Customer: intended use and requirements, each with its risk, on the Configuration Validation record, traced to tests in a generated traceability matrix. Proved by requirementAC-cv-testing-7and testcv_ | Built |
| §4.5 | The system is developed under an appropriate QMS; supplier assessed | Vendor's QMS; the validation kit is its evidence | Vendor |
| §4.6 | Bespoke systems: formal quality and performance reporting | nil is a configured product, not bespoke | Not applicable |
| §4.7 | Evidence of test methods and scenarios: limits, data limits, error handling; test tools assessed; test environments assessed for adequacy | Tests cover empties, limits, and malformed input; no retries in validation runs. Environments run PROD's exact release and start from PROD's configuration with a matching fingerprint, kept apart from PROD by process and database role, and say on every page that they aren't production Proved by requirementAC-validation-kit-2and testvalidation_ | Built |
| §4.8 | Data migration doesn't alter value or meaning | Document import checks every row in a dry run and is all or nothing, with a hashed report. Configuration copied into an environment travels as a hashed package; a release applies exactly the tested changes to production, only if both configuration fingerprints match. Proved by requirementAC-cv-records-3and testcv_ | Built |
| §5 | Built-in checks on data exchanged with other systems | No interfaces yet (API: none). Entry checks are cited here too; strictly §6 is the better fit | Not applicable |
| §6 | Extra accuracy check on critical manual entries (second person or validated electronic means) | Server-side validation of every value; a workflow can add a second-person verification step Proved by requirementAC-option-lists-2and testoption_ | Built |
| §7.1 | Stored data protected, checked for accessibility, readability, accuracy | Audit chain verified daily and on demand; stored files never overwritten or deleted, and checked against their SHA-256 on every read Proved by requirementAC-audit-trail-4and testaudit_ | Built |
| §7.2 | Regular backups; restore checked during validation and periodically | Not built | Planned |
| §8.1 | Clear printed copies | Exports; printable configuration specification Proved by requirementAC-configuration-4and testconfiguration_ | Built |
| §8.2 | Printouts show whether data changed since entry (batch release) | Record printout with its change history | Planned |
| §9 | Audit trail of GMP-relevant changes; reason recorded; intelligible; regularly reviewed | Audit trail with reasons as the settings require, readable and filterable Proved by requirementAC-settings-1and testsettings_ | Partly built |
| §10 | Changes, including configuration, only in a controlled way under a procedure | Production accepts changes to validated configuration only as a package released by an approved Configuration Validation record: designed in a changeset, tested in a validation environment, approved by someone independent, released only between the tested fingerprints. Every page states the validation state, and a daily and start-up check finds any change made outside nil. Proved by requirementAC-cv-records-6and testcv_ | Built |
| §11 | Periodic evaluation that the system remains valid | Access reviews; baseline diffs; the validation state on every page and the daily check that production remains in its validated state. Planned: a generated periodic evaluation pack Proved by requirementAC-configuration-3and testconfiguration_ | Partly built |
| §12.1–12.4 | Access controls by criticality; access changes recorded; identity on every entry | Access model; every access change audited with impact preview. Environments: entered only through PROD's sign-in (single-use, one-minute hand-over), no passwords of their own Proved by requirementAC-environments-4and testenvironments_ | Built |
| §13 | Incidents reported and assessed; root cause for critical ones; CAPA | The Deviations and CAPA modules can carry system incidents | Customer's procedure |
| §14 | E-signatures equivalent to handwritten, permanently linked, time-stamped | E-signatures Proved by requirementAC-e-signatures-3and testsignatures_ | Built |
| §15 | Batch release only by Qualified Persons, e-signed | Not a medicinal-product batch system | Not applicable |
| §16 | Business continuity for critical processes | The customer's plan; nil supplies exports | Customer's procedure |
| §17 | Archived data stays accessible, readable, and intact across system changes | Not built | Planned |
The 2025 draft revision
A draft for consultation, not in force. Its requirements are far more specific than the 2011 text; these rows are what it adds or sharpens.
| Clause | Asks for (paraphrased) | How nil answers it | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| §6.6 | Configuration options described in the requirements; the chosen configuration documented in a controlled configuration specification | The configuration specification generated from the live system, with signed validated baselines Proved by requirementAC-configuration-validation-1and testconfiguration_ | Built |
| §8.1–8.7 | Alarms where the user relies on being notified; acknowledged by authorized people with a comment; an alarm log, searchable and reviewed | The alarm for a change made outside nil: emailed, shown in red on every page, and decided in a Configuration deviation with what happened and a signature; all in the audit trail Proved by requirementAC-configuration-validation-6and testconfiguration_ | Built |
| §9.2 | Validation scope based on a documented risk assessment of individual requirements | Each requirement on a CV carries a risk and the reason; High and Medium need a test Proved by requirementAC-cv-testing-1and testcv_ | Built |
| §9.5 | Test cases traceable to requirements, e.g. a traceability matrix | A generated traceability matrix per CV; vendor tests trace to acceptance criteria Proved by requirementAC-cv-testing-7and testcv_ | Built |
| §9.7 | Validation according to approved plans, protocols, and test scripts | The test protocol is approved, signed, before testing starts Proved by requirementAC-cv-testing-2and testcv_ | Built |
| §9.8 | Conditional approval with documented assessment of deficiencies | Test incidents explain failed runs (what failed, why, impact, resolution) and appear in the summary report Proved by requirementAC-cv-testing-4and testcv_ | Built |
| §9.9 | Vendor documentation reviewed and authorized by the regulated user | The vendor validation report per release, for the user to review Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Built |
| §11.4 | Passwords set by someone else changed at first login | Accounts start from an invitation: people set their own password Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Built |
| §11.5 | Password rules commensurate with risk: length, mixed characters, no dictionary words, different from previous | Minimum length and a check against common passwords; composition rules aren't enforced (current NIST guidance prefers length) Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Partly built |
| §11.6 | Multifactor authentication for remote access to critical systems | Two-factor sign-in with an authenticator app. A validated setting requires it for everyone: anyone without it sets it up before doing anything else, and nobody can turn it off Proved by requirementAC-user-administration-13and testauth_ | Built |
| §11.7 | Accounts locked after failed attempts, unlocked only by an administrator | Sign-in pauses after 5 failures. After a set number of wrong passwords in a row (10 by default, a validated setting) the account locks: no sign-in method opens it, a password reset included, until an administrator unlocks it with a rationale. Both are audited and in the person's access log Proved by requirementAC-user-administration-12and testadmin_ | Built |
| §11.8 | Automatic inactivity logout the user can't change | Session idle timeout set for everyone by the administrator Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Built |
| §11.9 | An access log of logins and logouts (incl. inactivity logouts), searchable or exportable | Sign-ins, failures, sign-outs, revoked sessions, and sessions ended by inactivity or their time limit (at the moment they ended), recorded per person Proved by requirementAC-user-administration-11and testauth_ | Built |
| §11.10 | Segregation of duties (GMP users without administrative rights) and least privilege | Allow-only roles from a fixed permission catalog; the customer decides who administers Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Built |
| §11.11 | Recurrent access reviews, including the access of roles | Signed periodic access reviews over a frozen snapshot of who holds what Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Built |
| §12.2 | Audit trail: who (with their role, if they hold several), what (old and new), when (with time zone), why (prompted) | Who with the roles they held at that moment, what with old and new values, when (UTC), and why where the settings ask for a rationale Proved by requirementAC-audit-trail-14and testsignatures_ | Built |
| §12.3 | Audit trail locked; changing its settings or the time recorded; only by an administrator outside GMP work | Always on, append-only and hash-chained; settings changes are audited; time from the server clock Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Built |
| §12.4, §12.9 | Audit trail searchable and sortable; a complete electronic copy that can be searched | The audit trail browser with filters; CSV export with its hashes Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Built |
| §12.5–12.8 | Documented, risk-based, independent, and timely audit trail reviews | Planned: scheduled audit trail review records, signed | Planned |
| §13.3 | Full re-authentication for a signature; password only for signatures in immediate sequence | User ID and password on the first signature in a session, password after Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Built |
| §13.6 | A signature's manifestation: full name, username, role, meaning, and date and time (with time zone) | Name, the roles the signer held when signing, user ID (email), meaning, and date and time in UTC Proved by requirementAC-e-signatures-12and testsignatures_ | Built |
| §13.8 | A signed record changed later shows as unsigned | Each signature holds the hash of what was signed and shows whether it is still valid Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Built |
| §13.9 | Hybrid: a hash of the electronic record printed on the signature page | PDFs carry the content hash Several requirements; see nil’s validation report. | Built |
| §14.2(iii) | Undocumented changes found, e.g. by configuration auditing | A daily and start-up check finds any change made outside nil Proved by requirementAC-configuration-validation-6and testconfiguration_ | Built |
| §14.1–14.3 | Periodic reviews of the system's validated state, by plan | Planned: a periodic evaluation pack with the changes, reviews, and incidents since the last one | Planned |
| §15–17 | Security, backup, restore tests, and archiving | The hosting and the customer's procedures; nil never deletes data | Vendor |
Reading this table
- Built
- In nil today. Where one requirement answers the clause, its trace names that requirement and the test that proves it, passing in nil’s suite; where several do, the row says so and nil’s validation report lists them.
- Partly built
- Part of the clause is in nil today; the row says which part is not yet.
- Planned
- On the roadmap, not in nil today.
- Customer's procedure
- Met by your procedures; nil may record or support it.
- Vendor
- Met by nil’s supplier quality system rather than by the software.
- Not applicable
- The clause does not apply to a system like nil; the row says why.